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FREEDOM OF UNSPOKEN SPEECH: 
IMPLIED DEFAMATION AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.1 
(decided May 29, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The battle between a plaintiff’s reputational interests and a 
defendant’s First Amendment right to free speech has been ongoing 
ever since 1964, when the United States Supreme Court declared that 
the First Amendment significantly limits a plaintiff’s right to recover 
for defamation.2  On the one hand, the cause of action for defamation 
exists because the law recognizes that a person’s reputation and good 
name are some of his most prized possessions.3  On the other hand, 
the United States Constitution guarantees its citizens certain inaliena-
ble rights, including the right to express oneself freely through speech 
and press.  So fundamental are these rights that they were included in 
the very First Amendment to the Constitution in 1791: “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press[.]”4  These two competing interests—reputation versus free 
speech—clash when a defendant oversteps the boundary of his First 
 
1 987 N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014). 
2 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that the First Amendment lim-
its a public official’s defamation claims and requires him to prove the defendant’s actual 
malice); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (“In 1964, we de-
cided in [Sullivan] that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution placed limits 
on the application of the state law of defamation.”). 
3 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 12, 22. 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22 (“[The Court recognizes the 
First] Amendment’s vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues.”). 
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Amendment right to say what he wants and enters defamatory territo-
ry by expressing an untruth that harms the plaintiff’s reputation. 
But what happens when a defendant expresses a truth that 
harms the plaintiff’s reputation, by implying an untruth?  In actions 
known as implied defamation, a plaintiff may recover for a defend-
ant’s statement that, while literally true, insinuates a fact about the 
plaintiff that is false and defamatory.5  Once again, the interests of 
reputation and free speech collide because actions for implied defa-
mation permit recovery for that which the defendant does not say, ra-
ther than what the defendant does say.  While defendants’ unsaid im-
plications may undeniably produce damaging consequences, these 
defendants are still accorded the constitutional freedom to say or 
write what they please, so long as their statements are truthful.6  
Complications arise, and courts have thus developed competing ap-
proaches, when the defendant’s statement is itself literally truthful, 
but the underlying meaning is false.7 
This Note will take an analytical look at Stepanov v. Dow 
Jones & Co., Inc.,8 a recent decision by the First Department of the 
New York State Supreme Court’s Appellate Division, which ad-
dressed the issue of implied defamation.  The Note will be divided 
into eight Parts, including this Introduction and a Conclusion.  Part II 
will outline the relevant facts and the court’s discussion in Stepanov.  
Part III will provide a broad context for defamation both generally 
and in New York, while Part IV will explore Supreme Court prece-
dent that has placed First Amendment limitations on state defamation 
claims.  The First Amendment concerns raised specifically by im-
plied defamation claims, along with the various approaches adopted 
by the federal circuit courts and New York State courts, will be dis-
cussed in Parts V and VI, respectively.  Finally, Part VII will revisit 
 
5 See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 566 
(2d ed. 2000); see also Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, 85 F.3d 383, 
386 (8th Cir. 1996) (observing that implied defamation occurs “when an otherwise innocent 
statement is interpreted to have defamatory meaning”); Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 
F.2d 1087, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that defamatory implications arise from the falsity of 
implications/innuendos, rather than the facts as literally stated); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116 (Supp. 1988) (“[A] defamatory implica-
tion [occurs when a defendant] juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory con-
nection between them, or creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts . . . even though 
the particular facts are correct.”). 
6 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
7 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 5. 
8 987 N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014). 
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Stepanov and argue that, in light of existing federal and state prece-
dent, the First Department’s approach and outcome were both cor-
rect. 
II. STEPANOV V. DOW JONES & CO., INC. 
The plaintiffs in Stepanov sued the defendant for implied def-
amation—namely, for publishing an article whose statements, while 
facially true, falsely suggested that the plaintiffs were involved in a 
tax embezzlement conspiracy.9  On appeal of the trial court’s dismis-
sal of the plaintiffs’ claims, the First Department reasoned that since 
the plaintiffs did not challenge the statements as printed, but rather 
the statements’ unsaid implications, a heightened standard of review 
was required in order to stay within the bounds of the First Amend-
ment.10  The court thus held that in actions for defamation by implica-
tion, a plaintiff must make a “rigorous showing” that the challenged 
language, when read in context with the entire communication, can 
be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to af-
firmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that infer-
ence.”11 
A. Factual Background 
Maxim Stepanov (“Stepanov”), a Russian businessman, and 
his company, Midland Consult Ltd. (“Midland”), (collectively, the 
“Plaintiffs”) sued Dow Jones & Company (the “Defendant”) for def-
amation in an article entitled Crime and Punishment in Putin’s Rus-
sia, which appeared in a newspaper published by the Defendant.12  
The article provided in relevant part that some of Midland’s employ-
ees were also directors of a shell company that was “nested inside” of 
yet another company, Bristoll Export, which had allegedly made 
some suspicious financial transactions.13  The article further noted 
that Maxim Stepanov was a “former Russian Diplomat” and that oth-
er persons with the same last name, Stepanov—Olga Stepanova and 
her husband Vladlen Stepanov—were involved in a tax embezzle-
 
9 Id. at 41. 
10 See id. at 44. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 39. 
13 Stepanov, 987 N.Y.S.2d at 40. 
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ment scheme, money laundering, and political corruption.14 
B. Procedural History 
The Plaintiffs alleged that these statements from the Defend-
ant’s article were impliedly defamatory.15  Specifically, the Plaintiffs 
took issue with the article for stating that (1) the Plaintiffs were con-
nected to Bristoll Export, but failing to explain that there was no such 
connection at the time of the suspicious activities; (2) some Midland 
employees were also directors of Bristoll Export’s shell company, but 
neglecting to note that the suspicious activities occurred before these 
employees had any management role with Bristoll Export or its shell 
company; (3) Stepanov was a former Russian diplomat, in the context 
of discussing corruption in Putin’s Russia, without mentioning that 
Stepanov was never a Russian diplomat while Putin was in power; 
and (4) Olga Stepanova and Vladlen Stepanov were involved in 
fraudulent activities and political corruption, but failing to clarify that 
the plaintiff, Maxim Stepanov, was in no way related to Olga or Vla-
dlen.16  The Plaintiffs claimed that by omitting crucial clarifications 
and failing to include a timeline of events, the article’s statements 
falsely suggested that the Plaintiffs were associated with the fraudu-
lent schemes described.17  Although the Plaintiffs did not argue that 
the statements as published were false or inaccurate, they asserted 
that when read in context, the statements created false and misleading 
implications.18  The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim for defamation, and the Plaintiffs 
appealed to the First Department of the New York State Supreme 
Court’s Appellate Division.19 
C. Court Discussion 
On appeal, the First Department affirmed the trial court’s de-
cision.20  The appellate court first explained that while express defa-
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 40-41. 
16 Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No. 150534/2012, 2013 WL 1727123 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County Apr. 18, 2013). 
17 See Stepanov, 987 N.Y.S.2d at 42. 
18 Id. at 41. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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mation is premised on “direct statements,” implied defamation is 
based on “false suggestions, impressions and implications arising 
from otherwise truthful statements.”21  The court observed that New 
York courts have recognized actions for defamation by implication in 
the past, but they have not yet articulated the appropriate standard to 
be applied in light of the federal constitutional implications.22  The 
court thus remarked that in order to formulate the proper standard, 
two competing interests needed to be balanced: the plaintiff’s right to 
recover in tort for defamatory statements and the defendant’s First 
Amendment freedom to express speech that is “substantially truth-
ful.”23 
Relying primarily on federal precedent, the First Department 
concluded that defamation by implication requires a higher standard 
of review than express defamation.24  In Biro v. Condé Nast, the 
Southern District of New York applied a standard derived from a line 
of federal circuit courts of appeals cases, which were also cited by “at 
least one” New York State trial court in an implied defamation ac-
tion.25  The D.C. Circuit, relying on Eighth Circuit precedent, had de-
termined that in actions for defamation where the challenged com-
munication “conveys materially true facts from which a defamatory 
inference can reasonably be drawn,” the communication will be con-
sidered defamatory only if the context “supplies additional, affirma-
tive evidence suggesting that the defendant intends or endorses the 
defamatory inference.”26  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit established a 
standard by which the plaintiff must make an “especially rigorous 
showing” that the language not only implies a “false innuendo, but it 
must also affirmatively suggest that the author intends or endorses the 
inference.”27  The New York County Supreme Court has quoted this 
Fourth Circuit standard in an implied defamation claim.28 
 
21 See id. at 42 (citing Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 649 N.E.2d 825, 829 (N.Y. 
1995)). 
22 Stepanov, 987 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43 (discussing Armstrong, 649 N.E.2d 825; Rinaldi v. 
Holt, 366 N.E.2d 1299 (N.Y. 1977); and November v. Time, Inc., 194 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 
1963)). 
23 Id. at 43. 
24 See id. at 44. 
25 Id. at 43 (citing Biro v. Condé Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
26 Id. (citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (em-
phases in original)). 
27 Stepanov, 987 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (citing Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1093). 
28 Id. at 43-44 (citing Rappaport v. VV Publ’g Corp., 618 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1994), aff’d, Rappaport v. VV Publ’g Corp., 637 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
5
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Ultimately, the Stepanov court articulated a standard that it 
believed “struck the appropriate balance” between a plaintiff’s right 
to recover for defamatory implications and a defendant’s First 
Amendment right to publish statements that are substantially true: “a 
plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the 
communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a 
defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author in-
tended or endorsed that inference.”29  The court applied this standard 
and determined that each of the Defendant’s challenged statements 
were substantially true, that the statements did not create any false 
implications, and that in any event, the Plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that the Defendant intended any of the alleged implications.30 
III. DEFAMATION 
Traditionally, defamation actions allow a plaintiff to recover 
for a defendant’s false statements that harm the plaintiff’s reputation.  
A plaintiff must show (1) a false and defamatory statement of and 
concerning him/her; (2) publication to a third party without privilege; 
(3) that the defendant was at least negligent; and (4) harm or defama-
tion per se.31  Defamation includes the torts of libel—defamation 
through writing and other similar means—and slander—defamation 
through oral communication.32  Since the elements to prove both libel 
and slander are virtually identical,33 this Note will refer to both under 
the umbrella term “defamation.” 
A. Implied Defamation 
In some instances, a communication will not be defamatory 
on its face (“express defamation”), but through context and other rhe-
torical devices, a defamatory implication may arise (“implied defa-
mation”).34  While some statements will lead to defamatory infer-
ences that are logically unavoidable, others may result in two 
 
1996)). 
29 Id. at 44. 
30 Id. at 44-46. 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
32 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 5, at § 519. 
33 The elements for both are nearly identical, with the exception of form (i.e., one is writ-
ten while the other is spoken) and the type of damages to be proved.  Id. at §§ 519, 534. 
34 See id. at §§ 566, 526. 
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possible inferences—one defamatory and one not.35  For example, the 
statement, “I am the only one of my siblings who knows how to 
swim,” leads to the unavoidable conclusion that my sister (assuming 
that I have one) does not know how to swim.  On the other hand, the 
statement, “Mary was swimming in an ocean,” could lead to two pos-
sibilities, depending on the context.36  If the surrounding circum-
stances are that Mary was at a beach, then she was likely swimming 
in a literal ocean; yet, the context could likewise demonstrate that 
“ocean” was meant metaphorically, as in Mary was swimming in a 
“sea of troubles.”37  Since the versatility of language allows for ideas 
to be expressed in infinitely various forms, both expressly and im-
pliedly, there are several ways in which a communication can lead to 
a defamatory implication: (1) by omitting relevant facts that lead to a 
misleading impression;38 (2) by juxtaposing facts that when read con-
textually lead to a misleading impression;39 and (3) by hiding behind 
the façade of a constitutionally protected opinion, when in reality it 
suggests false and defamatory facts.40 
B. Defamation Claims in New York 
The State of New York has long recognized defamation ac-
tions, which arise from a defendant’s false statements that “expose 
the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or in-
duce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, 
and . . . deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.”41  A 
New York plaintiff must demonstrate that a false statement was pub-
lished to a third party without privilege or authorization, that the de-
fendant was at least negligent, and that some injury resulted or that it 
constitutes defamation per se.42  When determining whether a state-
 
35 Id. at § 566. 
36 Id. 
37 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 5. 
38 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5. 
39 Id. 
40 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.  Since the latter type of implied defamation (and the 
applicable standard) has been directly addressed by the Supreme Court in Milkovich, this 
Case Note focuses primarily on the former two types, which have been approached different-
ly by various courts. 
41 Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996) (citing Rinaldi, 366 N.E.2d at 
1305). 
42 Stepanov, N.Y.S.2d at 41-42; Epifani v. Johnson, 882 N.Y.S.2d 234, 242 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 2009); Roche v. Claverack Coop. Ins. Co., 874 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595-96 (App. Div. 3d 
7
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ment is defamatory, the language must be read in context with the en-
tire communication.43  New York also recognizes claims for defama-
tion by implication, which the Court of Appeals has defined as defa-
mation “premised not on direct statements but on false suggestions, 
impressions and implications arising from otherwise truthful state-
ments.”44 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH AND PRESS CLAUSES: 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN THE 
DEFAMATION CONTEXT 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press[.]”45  This protection has been made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; there-
fore, states are not permitted to create laws that intrude on a citizen’s 
rights to free speech and press.46  There are a number of First 
Amendment concerns that arise from allowing actions for defamation 
by implication.  First, if the challenged communication is of a public 
concern, then the problem of limiting free public debate arises.47  
Second, statements that suggest implicit assertions may be under-
stood as an opinion or as “rhetorical hyperbole,” both of which are 
constitutionally protected and nonactionable.48  Finally, defamatory 
implications lead to lawsuits not for what is said, but for what is un-
said, and this treads on the protected territory of a defendant’s right to 
make truthful statements.49 
 
Dep’t 2009); Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999). 
43 Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550, 553 (N.Y. 1986); Dillon, 704 N.Y.S.2d at 38. 
44 Armstrong, 649 N.E.2d at 829; see also discussion infra Part VI (providing a more in-
depth discussion of implied defamation in New York). 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
46 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the 
press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are 
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
47 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
48 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
49 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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A. Public-Private Distinction 
The United States Supreme Court first considered the consti-
tutional implications of state defamation claims in the 1964 landmark 
case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.50  In Sullivan, the New York 
Times had published a newspaper advertisement entitled Heed Their 
Rising Voices, which criticized the “unprecedented wave of terror” 
and overall violent response to civil rights demonstrators, led by Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., in the Southern United States.51  In this con-
text, the article discussed the Montgomery, Alabama police force, 
which showed up “armed with shotguns and tear-gas” in response to 
Alabama State College student protesters.52  The Montgomery Coun-
ty Commissioner, who supervised the Montgomery Police Depart-
ment, sued for defamation, contesting several inaccuracies in the ad-
vertisement and claiming that the advertisement’s criticism of the 
police force would be imputed to him.53 
The Sullivan Court declared that a heightened standard of 
fault was required for this defamation action because it involved a 
plaintiff who was a “public official.”54  The Court emphasized the 
importance of the First Amendment’s free speech and press clauses, 
which are meant to “assure unfettered interchange of ideas” with re-
spect to political and social discussion.55  This country recognizes the 
“fundamental principle” that public debate remain “uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and [that] it may well include vehement, caus-
tic, and unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials.”56  The Constitution necessarily places limitations on actions 
for defamation, particularly when a public official is involved.57  
Thus, a public official must show that the defendant acted with “actu-
al malice,” defined as “knowledge that [the defamatory statement] 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”58 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have announced similar 
 
50 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
51 Id. at 256-58. 
52 Id. at 257. 
53 Id. at 258. 
54 Id. at 279-80. 
55 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269. 
56 Id. at 269-70. 
57 See id. at 279-80. 
58 Id. 
9
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limitations on actions for defamation.  In Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts,59 the Court extended the Sullivan actual malice standard to in-
clude criticism of “public figures,” defined as “persons involved in 
issues in which the public has a justified and important interest.”60  
Thereafter, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.61 considered the 
standard to be applied when a private person is defamed regarding a 
matter of “public concern.”62  The Court reasoned that public officials 
and public figures have assumed the “increased risk of injury” from 
defamation by voluntarily placing themselves in the public eye.63  
Private individuals, however, have not voluntarily subjected them-
selves to such public criticism, so they are more “vulnerable to inju-
ry,” and the state has a greater interest in protecting them.64  Con-
sistent with Sullivan, the Gertz Court noted that the First Amendment 
interest in free public debate still requires a showing of some “fault” 
(i.e., negligence) when the communication is of a public concern, but 
that the Constitution does not require a standard as high as actual 
malice.65  Still, states are free to heighten the standard if they see fit.66  
Finally, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,67 the Court 
considered the issue of defaming private individuals regarding a non-
public concern.68  The Court there found that common law rules for 
defamation are sufficient because there are no First Amendment in-
terests at stake when private individuals are defamed on private mat-
ters.69 
Supreme Court precedent discussing the distinctions between 
public and private individuals and public and private matters demon-
strates the importance placed on open public discussion by the First 
Amendment.  There is a direct correlation between the level of public 
concern and the respective standard of fault to be used.  When a def-
amation plaintiff is a public official or public figure, First Amend-
ment protections are at their apex and require a showing of actual 
 
59 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
60 Id. at 134. 
61 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
62 Id. at 327. 
63 Id. at 345. 
64 Id. at 344. 
65 Id. at 347. 
66 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
67 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
10
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malice.70  If the plaintiff is a private individual defamed on matters of 
public concern, he must still show some fault on the part of the de-
fendant, but is held to a much lower standard.71  Finally, when both 
the plaintiff and the matter are private, the First Amendment is not 
implicated, and ordinary common law standards apply.72 
B. Opinions 
The First Amendment also protects expressions of “pure opin-
ion,”73 defined as statements that cannot be objectively verified.74  
The Supreme Court noted in Gertz that “[u]nder the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea.75  However pernicious an opin-
ion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”76  Subse-
quent circuit court decisions initially interpreted this to mean that 
while factually false statements are actionable, expressions of opinion 
are absolutely protected because they are unable to be proven false.77  
 
70 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Curtis, 388 U.S. 130. 
71 See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. 
72 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. 749. 
73 Although the Supreme Court has rejected a definitive distinction between actionable 
fact and protected opinion, Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1, many circuit courts have since adopted the 
term “pure opinion” to refer to the sort of opinion that the Milkovich Court would agree is 
constitutionally protected, as opposed to the sort of “mixed fact and opinion” that the Milko-
vich Court would consider actionable.  See ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 
F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 2013); Bennett v. Hendrix, 325 F. App’x 727, 742 n.8 (11th Cir. 
2009); Jolliff v. N.L.R.B., 513 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2008); Gibson v. Boy Scouts of Am., 
163 F. App’x 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2006); Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 
1995); see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 5, at § 568 nn.7 & 10; Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Mat-
ter of Opinion, Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 472-74 
(1994) (“[The Milkovich] Court immunized only pure, evaluative opinion.”). 
74 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 5, at § 568, n.10; see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (finding 
that statements will enjoy First Amendment protection if they contain “loose, figurative” 
language that is not “sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false”). 
75 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339. 
76 Id. at 339-40; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he theory of our Constitution [is that] the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get it-
self accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.”). 
77 See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431-32 (8th Cir. 1989) (ob-
serving that opinions are “absolutely protected” and applying the four factor test from Oll-
man); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (creating a four-factor test for 
distinguishing actionable fact from protected opinion); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 
552-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the “constitutional privilege for opinion,” as contrasted 
with statements of fact, which may be actionable). 
11
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In turn, the courts developed tests to distinguish between actionable 
factual assertions and protected opinion.78 
The Supreme Court rejected this bright line approach in 
Milkovich v. Lorain.79  The Court ruled that it never intended to cre-
ate a “wholesale” First Amendment protection for statements of opin-
ion.80  The protection applies only to statements that are incapable of 
being proven false, such as subjective ideas, value judgments, and 
evaluative opinions.81  While the Milkovich Court purported to do 
away with the fact-opinion distinction, this decision was not fatal to 
the concept of protected opinions.  The Court did not take issue with 
the protection of opinions that constitute subjective personal views; 
the Court instead took issue with the “artificial” labeling of fact ver-
sus opinion, which can lead to misleading results.82  For example, “I 
think that John is a liar” is merely a factual assertion disguised as an 
opinion through the inclusion of the words, “I think.”83  The Court 
wanted to make clear that statements in this vein should not be pro-
tected.84  Expressions of “pure opinion,” such as “Mary is trashy,” are 
absolutely protected because there is no objective way to prove this 
statement true or false; it is merely a subjective personal belief.85 
The Supreme Court has recognized other First Amendment 
protections that are closely related to, if not the same as, opinions.  
First, it has safeguarded loose, figurative language and rhetorical hy-
perbole.86  Similarly, the Court has expressed that a sarcastic parody 
 
78 See, e.g., Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979-83 (applying a four-factor test to determine whether 
a statement is fact or opinion: (1) “the specific language used”; (2) “the degree to which the 
statement [is] verifiable”; (3) “the immediate context of the . . . statement”; and (4) “the 
broader social context into which the statement fits.”). 
79 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
80 Id. at 18. 
81 See id. at 22 (construing the published statement about the plaintiff, “Anyone who at-
tended the meet . . . knows in his heart that [the plaintiff] . . . lied at the hearing after each 
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth,” as a sufficiently objective, verifiable assertion 
that the plaintiff had committed perjury); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 5, at § 568; Sowle, supra 
note 73, at 474 (“[The Milkovich] Court immunized only pure, evaluative opinion.  Thus, a 
pure, deductive opinion, which is provable as true or false on the basis of objective evidence, 
carries no immunity.”). 
82 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19. 
83 See id. at 18-19. 
84 Id. 
85 See Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 130 (1st Cir. 1997) (ob-
serving that the word “trashy” is an “elusive . . . chameleon” whose definition is too 
loose/imprecise to constitute an objectively verifiable statement). 
86 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (citing Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 
U.S. 6 (1970)).  In Greenbelt, a local newspaper characterized a prominent politician as hav-
12
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with no real assertion of fact cannot be actionable under the First 
Amendment.87 
C. Truth 
The First Amendment additionally protects a defendant’s 
statements that are true or substantially true.  Although truth will 
nonetheless protect a defendant since falsity is an element of the 
plaintiff’s defamation claim, truth likewise implicates a defendant’s 
First Amendment protections.88  The doctrine of “substantial truth” 
was established because the Supreme Court recognized that political 
debate will naturally lead to “minor inaccuracies,” but these inaccu-
racies cannot destroy a defendant’s protection where the overall 
“gist” of the statement is substantially true.89 
V. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON IMPLIED DEFAMATION 
ACTIONS 
With the foregoing constitutional principles in mind, the fol-
lowing section will discuss the ways in which the First Amendment 
complicates courts’ treatment of implied defamation claims.  Because 
so much of defamation law and its constitutional boundaries are un-
clear, there is a general lack of uniformity among the federal circuit 
courts of appeals in dealing with actions for implied defamation in 
light of First Amendment free speech protections. 
 
ing made negotiations for zoning variances as “blackmail.”  398 U.S. at 7-8.  The Court de-
termined that it was “simply impossible” that a reader would have believed that the plaintiff 
was involved in criminal activities.  Id. at 14.  The plaintiff was merely being criticized, and 
the word choice of “blackmail” was “no more than rhetorical hyperbole,” a literary device 
that a publisher is free to use under the First Amendment.  Id. 
87 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 57 (1988) (holding that the First 
Amendment, which protects free public debate, does not permit a public figure’s recovery 
for what was clearly a parody and did not purport to convey any true facts, where defendant 
magazine published a fabricated interview in which a well-known pastor and televangelist 
was depicted as having had an incestuous relationship with his mother). 
88 Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092-93 (“The constitution provides a sanctuary for truth.”); Mas-
son v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991) (“The common law of libel . . . 
overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth. . . . Minor inaccuracies 
do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge 
can be justified.”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[T]he erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (“Truth may 
not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is 
concerned.”). 
89 Masson, 501 U.S. at 517. 
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A. Heightened Standard 
A majority of the circuit courts that have considered actions 
for implied defamation have held that the First Amendment demands 
a higher standard of fault.90  The Second and Eighth Circuits are in 
the minority that treat implied defamation actions no differently than 
claims for express defamation.91  Further complications arise in cases 
that address the standard of fault required in implied defamation 
claims brought by public officials or public figures.  The applicable 
standard in implied defamation actions, and the applicable standard in 
express defamation actions involving public officials/figures, are two 
distinct standards that derive from separate First Amendment con-
cerns, yet many courts have addressed the issues simultaneously and 
created one hybrid standard of fault.  This makes it difficult to extract 
the reasons behind the courts’ application of a heightened standard 
since defamation claims by public officials/figures are already evalu-
ated under the stringent “actual malice” standard.  In turn, these cases 
create ambiguity as to which standard should be applied in cases of 
implied defamation of private persons since private individuals suing 
for defamation are not generally held to a higher standard. 
1. Heightened Standard—Generally 
The D.C. and Fourth Circuits have explicitly recognized ac-
tions for implied defamation, and both have applied similar standards 
of fault.92  In White v. Fraternal Order of Police,93 the D.C. Circuit 
noted the difficulty of determining the appropriate standard in im-
plied defamation cases where the stated facts are literally true.94  In 
its discussion, the D.C. Circuit explained that if a communication, 
 
90 See discussion infra Part V.A.1-2. 
91 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
92 The Eleventh Circuit also considered an implied defamation claim in Rubin v. U.S. 
News & World Report, Inc., but since it found that “no reasonable reading of the text sup-
port[ed] the [alleged] implication,” the court did not reach the issue of an applicable stand-
ard.  271 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001).  However, the court mentioned in a footnote that 
such claims raise a “First Amendment problem,” citing Chapin, White, and Dodds.  Id. at 
1309 n.11. 
93 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  The defendant in White had published articles that stat-
ed the true facts that the plaintiff, a police captain, tested positive for marijuana, and that a 
second drug test, which was “transported under irregular circumstances,” produced negative 
results.  Id. at 514.  The plaintiff asserted that these statements falsely suggested that he used 
drugs.  Id. at 516. 
94 Id. at 518. 
14
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read in context, is “materially true,” but a defamatory inference is 
possible, it is insufficient to prove defamation.95  On the other hand, 
if the communication, read in context, “supplies additional, affirma-
tive evidence suggesting that the defendant intends or endorses the 
defamatory inference,” then it will rise to the level of actionable def-
amation.96  The Fourth Circuit adopted the same standard in Chapin 
v. Knight-Ridder, Inc.97  Citing the D.C. Circuit’s White decision, the 
Fourth Circuit reasoned that since the plaintiff did not contest the lit-
eral facts as published, a more “rigorous” standard was required.98  
The First Amendment’s “sanctuary for truth” requires that the lan-
guage “affirmatively suggest that the defendant intends or endorses” 
the alleged inference.99 
2. Heightened Standard—In the Public 
Official/Figure Context 
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits100 have only consid-
ered claims of implied defamation brought by public officials or fig-
ures, and all have applied a hybrid standard of fault that fails to dis-
 
95 Id. at 520. 
96 White, 909 F.2d at 520.  Although the court did not explicitly voice First Amendment 
concerns, it based its standard partly upon an Eighth Circuit case, Janklow v. Newsweek, 
Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), in which the court found significant First Amendment 
limitations in actions for implied defamation. 
97 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993).  The plaintiff in Chapin operated a charity that sent care 
packages to American soldiers in Saudi Arabia.  Id. at 1091.  The defendant published an 
article that discussed the “hefty mark-up” between the cost of the items and the price paid by 
the public, wondered “where the rest of the money goes,” and made some other similar 
statements.  Id.  According to the plaintiff, the article suggested that he was pocketing the 
charity’s money.  Id. at 1093. 
98 Id. at 1092-93. 
99 Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092-93. 
100 In Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Services, the Sixth Circuit applied a stand-
ard for implied defamation that appeared to be distinct from the actual malice standard, but 
blurred the lines in its synthesis of the rule.  499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007).  After a lengthy 
discussion of whether the public figure plaintiff had proven actual malice, the court briefly 
addressed the plaintiff’s defamation claims that were based on implications.  Id. at 528-29.  
Citing Saenz and Newton (discussed below), both of which failed to draw the line between 
the standards for actual malice and implied defamation, the Sixth Circuit adopted a standard 
that requires the defendant “intended or knew of the [alleged] implication.”  Id.  The court 
also cited a standard from Milkovich that was specifically meant to apply only to public fig-
ures in the actual malice context, but applied it more generally to all implied defamation 
claims.  Id.  Ultimately, the court determined that the alleged implications could not reason-
ably be drawn, and it chose not to engage in a factual analysis.  Id. at 529.  This left unclear 
whether the standard was intended only for implied defamation against public figures or all 
implied defamation claims. 
15
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tinguish between the public figure actual malice standard and the im-
plied defamation standard.  Still, it is noteworthy that all have agreed 
that the traditional actual malice standard articulated in Sullivan is in-
sufficient when faced with the additional obstacle of defamation by 
implication.  Adopting similar standards of fault, these three circuits 
have required that the plaintiff demonstrate actual malice plus intent 
or endorsement of the defamatory inference. 
The Third Circuit recently held in Kendall v. Daily News Pub-
lishing Co.101 that in cases of implied defamation against a public of-
ficial, a higher standard of intent is required to show actual malice.102  
The Kendall court defined defamation by implication as defamation 
based on a statement with “two possible meanings”—one defamatory 
and one innocent, as contrasted with “ordinary defamation,” where 
the only possible meaning is defamatory.103  Because there are two 
possible meanings of impliedly defamatory statements, it is logically 
impossible in public figure cases to demonstrate actual malice merely 
by showing “knowledge of falsity” or “reckless disregard to it”; in 
other words, it cannot be proved that a person “knew” a statement 
was false if that statement could be interpreted both as innocent/true 
and as defamatory/false.104  Thus, a higher standard is required.105  
Citing to fellow circuits that also require heightened standards for 
implied defamation, the Third Circuit concluded that to prove actual 
malice for defamatory implications, a plaintiff must show that (1) the 
 
101 716 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2013).  The defendant in Kendall published an article discussing 
specific events in the plaintiff judge’s career, in which the judge had been lenient with some 
criminal defendants.  Id. at 84-85.  The judge, claiming that the article falsely suggested that 
his treatment of these defendants was unjustified, sued for implied defamation.  See id. 
102 Id. at 90.  Prior to Kendall, the Third Circuit first considered implied defamation in 
Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1978).  There, the for-
mer chairman of the Port Authority sued a television station for several statements it made 
implying that he misused his political connections for personal financial gain.  Id. at 497-99.  
Since the plaintiff conceded that “no specific statement” was incorrect, the court concluded 
that the defendant’s First Amendment free speech protections rendered the challenged innu-
endos nonactionable.  Id. at 509-10.  The plaintiff, a public figure, was required to show ac-
tual malice pursuant to Sullivan.  See id. at 507-08.  However, the court declared that im-
pliedly defamatory statements are incapable of proving actual malice because unstated 
innuendos cannot be used to show knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity where the facts 
as published are “literally correct.”  Id. at 509.  Oddly, nowhere in the Kendall decision does 
the court cite to its previous and related ruling in Pierce.  While the court’s analysis in Ken-
dall differs from Pierce, the Kendall decision is not inconsistent with the First Amendment 
concerns articulated in Pierce. 
103 Kendall, 716 F.3d at 89. 
104 Id. at 90. 
105 See id. 
16
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defendant intended or knew that the statement’s meaning was defam-
atory and recklessly disregarded the defamatory meaning, and (2) the 
defendant knew that the statement was false or recklessly disregarded 
its falsity.106 
In Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.,107 the Seventh Circuit 
made two important evaluations regarding defamation by implica-
tion: first, that it is possible for a statement to be defamatory even if it 
does not explicitly refer to the plaintiff;108 and second, that proving 
actual malice in defamation cases against public officials/figures re-
quires a showing of intent in addition to knowledge or reckless disre-
gard of falsity.109  The Seventh Circuit rejected the District Court’s 
theory that a plaintiff can only recover for defamatory statements in 
which the plaintiff is explicitly mentioned.110  The Seventh Circuit 
explained that such a rule would unfairly reward “crafty[,] mischie-
vous” defendants who seek to defame a plaintiff through the “subtle 
art of insinuation.”111  As a separate matter, the court also determined 
that “simply because a statement reasonably can be read to contain a 
defamatory inference does not mean . . . that this inference is the only 
reasonable one that can be drawn from the article.”112  Thus, the pos-
sibility of two different meanings—one defamatory and one not—
compels an additional finding of intent when demonstrating actual 
malice against a public official/figure.113  Mere “knowledge” or 
“reckless disregard of falsity,” the ordinary definition of actual mal-
ice, does not rise to the level of defamation when a defamatory impli-
cation has more than one possible meaning.114 
 
106 Id. at 92-93. 
107 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).  The plaintiff, who served as an official of the United 
States Office of Public Safety (“OPS”), was allegedly defamed in an article that accused the 
OPS of involvement in a violent riot that left many prisoners badly injured or dead.  Id. at 
1311.  The plaintiff claimed the article falsely implied that he was an “accomplice to torture 
and political terror.”  Id. at 1313.  The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the 
grounds that the plaintiff was never explicitly mentioned; rather, it was his employer that 
was accused of these acts.  Id. at 1313-14. 
108 Id. at 1314. 
109 Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1318. 
110 Id. at 1314. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1318 (citing Woods v. Evansville Press Co., Inc., 791 F.2d 480, 487 (7th Cir. 
1986)).  In Woods, the Seventh Circuit likewise found that in order to prove actual malice in 
the context of implied defamation, a higher standard is required than with express defama-
tion since implied statements can support more than one meaning.  See 791 F.2d at 487. 
113 Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1318. 
114 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit adopted a heightened standard for proving 
actual malice by making logical arguments similar to those of the 
Third and Seventh Circuits.115  The Ninth Circuit first held in Newton 
v. NBC116 that defamatory implications cannot possibly lead to a find-
ing of actual malice, or it would “eviscerate the First Amendment 
protections established by [Sullivan v.] New York Times” by allowing 
recovery not only for “what was not said but also for what was not 
intended to be said.”117  Later, the Ninth Circuit softened these senti-
ments in Dodds v. ABC,118 determining that defamatory implications 
may lead to a finding of actual malice, as long as there is proof that 
the defamatory statements were intended.119 
B. Ordinary Standard 
The Second and Eighth Circuits appear to be the only circuit 
courts that have allowed claims for defamation by implication with-
out applying a heightened standard.  In Cianci v. New Times Publish-
ing Co.,120 the Second Circuit considered the plaintiff’s claim that the 
defendant’s article implied he was a rapist.121  The article discussed 
how the plaintiff, the Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island at the time, 
had been accused of raping a woman, and that the charges were 
dropped and “nearly forgotten” about when she received a $3,000 
settlement.122  Overall, the article detailed the facts of the case with a 
suspicious undertone.123  The court noted that the plaintiff’s claims 
were based on both explicit statements and implicit suggestions and 
 
115 Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Partington v. Bugliosi primarily discussed 
statements of opinion that imply false facts, it acknowledged in a footnote that the Fourth 
and D.C. Circuits have applied a heightened standard to statements of fact that imply false 
facts.  56 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995). 
116 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990). 
117 Id. at 681. 
118 145 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998). 
119 See id. at 1064. 
120 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 56-58. 
123 See id. at 55-58.  For example, the headline of the article was, “BUDDY WE 
HARDLY KNEW YA”; the article repeatedly noted that “[the victim] took the lie detector 
test and passed; [the defendant] took it three times and failed each time”; and the article 
quoted the victim as having accepted the settlement as advice from her attorney, who found 
that she was “not . . . well enough to go on with the case,” despite the crime lab expert’s 
opinion that this was “one of the most clear cut cases of rape he had ever processed.”  Id. at 
56-57. 
18
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ultimately concluded that the alleged implications were “strong,” 
“clear,” and “fair.”124  The court came to its conclusions without ap-
plying any special standard.125 
Subsequent Second Circuit cases have left claims of implied 
defamation unchanged.126  In Herbert v. Lando,127 the court acknowl-
edged in dicta that claims based on defamatory implications or infer-
ences may be actionable, but it did not establish a standard to be ap-
plied to such claims.128  Likewise, the court in Levin v. McPhee129 
determined, in the context of a motion to dismiss, that the defendant’s 
statements were capable of a defamatory meaning, even though the 
alleged defamation was based on “implications” and “connota-
tions.”130  In a footnote, the court noted that it would “neither consid-
er nor decide . . . the proper standard to be applied to a motion to 
dismiss a claim of ‘defamation by implication’ ” under New York 
law.131  Although the court was applying New York State law in this 
diversity case, it is notable that the Second Circuit, a federal court, 
did not find any First Amendment or other constitutional issues with 
the implied defamation claim. 
The Eighth Circuit likewise does not apply a heightened 
standard to implied defamation claims, although it has expressed First 
Amendment concerns with such actions.  In older, pre-Milkovich 
opinions, the Eighth Circuit had only considered implied defamation 
claims in the context of evaluating whether the statements constituted 
protected opinion.132  The court first declared in Janklow v. 
Newsweek, after conducting a four-factor analysis to decipher fact 
versus opinion, that the First Amendment does not allow a plaintiff to 
recover on the basis of unsaid implications because they are too “im-
 
124 Id. at 60. 
125 See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 60. 
126 In Biro v. Condé Nast, the Southern District of New York adopted the standard that the 
Fourth Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and numerous New York State courts have articulated—
namely, that the plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant intended or endorsed the 
defamatory inference.  883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 464-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  In its discussion, the 
court commented that “neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the Second Circuit has 
established the standard to be applied on a motion to dismiss a defamatory implication 
claim.”  Id. at 464. 
127 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986). 
128 Id. at 307. 
129 119 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1997). 
130 Id. at 195. 
131 Id. at 196 n.5. 
132 See Janklow, 788 F.2d 1300; Price, 881 F.2d 1426. 
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precise” to be actionable.133  To conclude otherwise would “intrud[e] 
too closely into questions of editorial judgment.”134  Furthermore, it 
would be too difficult to prove the defamatory or false nature of an 
unstated implication.135  Three years later, while applying the same 
four-factor test, the Eighth Circuit boldly declared in Price v. Viking 
Penguin that it does “not recognize defamation by implication.”136  In 
neither Janklow nor Price did the Eighth Circuit use a heightened 
standard by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s in-
tent, as has become customary in other circuits.137  Instead, the court 
engaged in an analysis of whether the impliedly defamatory state-
ment was actionable fact or protected opinion.138  The court in both 
cases concluded that the imprecise nature of the defamatory implica-
tions supported a finding of constitutionally protected opinion.139 
In Toney v. WCCO Television,140 the Eighth Circuit expound-
ed upon its previous findings in Janklow and Price, and it also recon-
sidered them in light of the Supreme Court decision in Milkovich.141  
The district court in Toney had interpreted the Janklow and Price de-
cisions as having rejected any and all actions for implied defama-
tion.142  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court’s interpretation of these decisions for two reasons.  First, it not-
ed that its previous decisions in Janklow and Price merely established 
that a defamatory implication cannot satisfy the “precision” factor in 
its four-factor fact/opinion test, not that defamatory implications are 
never actionable.143  Second, the court held that in the wake of Milko-
vich, a four-factor test that distinguishes between fact and opinion is 
no longer appropriate, and that “Milkovich made clear that implica-
tions, like plain statements, may give rise to a defamation claim.”144  
 
133 Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302.  The court in Janklow applied the same four-factor test first 
articulated in Ollman v. Evans: (1) “the specific language used”; (2) “the degree to which the 
statement [is] verifiable”; (3) “the immediate context of the . . . statement”; and (4) “the 
broader social context into which the statement fits.”  750 F.2d at 979-84. 
134 Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1304. 
135 Id. 
136 Price, 881 F.2d at 1432. 
137 See discussion supra Part V.A. 
138 Price, 881 F.2d at 1431-33; Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302-05. 
139 Price, 881 F.2d at 1432; Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302-04. 
140 85 F.3d 383 (8th Cir. 1996). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 390. 
143 Id. at 393; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
144 Toney, 85 F.3d at 394. 
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The court stressed that it is not only possible but necessary that 
claims for implied defamation be allowed, lest the law allow defam-
ers to “accomplish indirectly what they could not do directly.”145  
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit has yet to apply a standard to defama-
tory implications that differs from the standard for express defama-
tion. 
VI. IMPLIED DEFAMATION IN NEW YORK 
It is not surprising that the inconsistent standards for implied 
defamation occur not only at the federal level, but also at the state 
level.  Few New York courts have directly addressed defamation by 
implication, but those that have addressed it have used differing ap-
proaches.  Many of the older decisions did not acknowledge separate 
actions or standards for what has come to be known today as “im-
plied defamation,” and they instead addressed allegations of defama-
tory implications in less direct ways.  Over time, however, the New 
York courts have begun to adopt the more stringent standard seen in 
many of the federal circuit courts of appeals. 
A. New York Court of Appeals 
The New York Court of Appeals first considered a claim 
analogous to implied defamation in November v. Time.146  An attor-
ney sued a magazine publisher and author of an article that allegedly 
defamed him.147  While he did not contest the literal statements as 
published, he argued that when read in context, the statements sug-
gested that he was “incompeten[t]” and “unethical.”148  The court 
found no directly defamatory statements, but held that the jury should 
be instructed to decide whether the context would render them de-
famatory—specifically, “whether a libelous intendment would natu-
rally be given to it by the reading public acquainted with the parties 
and the subject matter.”149  This decision occurred before New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan and before courts had ever given much consid-
eration to First Amendment concerns in defamation cases. 
 
145 Id. at 395. 
146 194 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 1963). 
147 Id. at 127. 
148 See id. 
149 Id. at 129 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Over a decade later, the Court of Appeals considered the 
“substantial truth” doctrine in Rinaldi v. Holt.150  There, a judge sued 
the publisher and author of a book that described the judge as “in-
competent,” “probably corrupt,” and “suspiciously lenient.”151  The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ statements were defamatory by 
omitting important details that would have negated the defamatory 
inferences.152  The court concluded that the defendant’s omission of 
minor details when everything else was substantially true did not re-
sult in an actionable defamation claim.153  In this post-Sullivan deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals emphasized the complex struggle between 
the constitutional interests of free speech and press versus an individ-
ual’s right to be compensated for defamation.154  Yet the court ex-
pressed that “in areas of doubt and conflicting considerations, it is 
thought better to err on the side of free speech.”155 
The closely related issue of an opinion that implies 
knowledge of facts was addressed in Steinhilber v. Alphonse.156  The 
plaintiff was a union member who violated a strike order by continu-
ing to work.157  Thereafter, the defendant, vice president of the union, 
recorded a telephone message discussing the plaintiff’s actions and 
sent it to all the union members.158  Among other things, the message 
described the plaintiff as a “scab,” a “failure,” and as lacking “talent, 
ambition, and initiative.”159  The plaintiff argued that all of the de-
fendant’s statements were suggestive of untrue facts, while the de-
fendant claimed that these were protected expressions of opinion.160  
The court ultimately found that in context, the defendant’s statements 
did not suggest any factual assertions and were merely subjective ex-
pressions meant to be taken figuratively.161 
In Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster,162 the Court of Appeals 
 
150 366 N.E.2d 1299 (N.Y. 1977). 
151 Id. at 1303. 
152 See id. at 1307. 
153 Id. at 1308. 
154 Id. at 1308-09. 
155 Rinaldi, 366 N.E.2d at 1309 (citing Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d 
Cir. 1977)). 
156 501 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1986). 
157 Id. at 551. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 551, 554-55. 
161 Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 554-56. 
162 649 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1995). 
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explicitly recognized defamation by implication as a valid cause of 
action, but declined to decide the applicable standard.163  The plaintiff 
was a criminal defense attorney who was allegedly defamed in the 
defendant’s book that depicted—through implications—the plaintiff 
as having encouraged his client to commit perjury.164  The court de-
termined that the claims should survive the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss since they were “reasonably susceptible of a defamatory con-
notation.”165  Since it had determined this threshold issue, the court 
did not reach the issue of the standard of proof in what it acknowl-
edged to be a claim of “defamation by implication.”166  Yet it correct-
ly noted that courts throughout the country have adopted differing 
standards in light of the concern that “substantially truthful speech be 
adequately protected.”167 
B. New York Appellate and Trial Courts 
The First Department in Cole Fischer Rogow, Inc. v. Carl Al-
ly, Inc.168 considered what it called defamation “by innuendo.”169  
The plaintiff advertisement agency alleged that the defendant’s ad-
vertisement referred to the plaintiff by innuendo when it criticized the 
plaintiff’s “type of advertising” and described it as “deceptive,” “in-
flammatory,” and “exploit[ative],” among other things.170  In its dis-
cussion, the court noted that libel falls into two categories: libel per 
se, which is defamatory on its face, and libel by innuendo, which re-
quires a showing of extrinsic facts or an alternate meaning not seen 
on its face.171  The court here merely determined whether the state-
ments were “capable” of a defamatory meaning without applying any 
particular standard of fault.172  Ultimately, the First Department con-
cluded that the defendant’s statements were not capable of a defama-
tory meaning since “only a strained, unreasonable and unjustified in-
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 826-28. 
165 Id. at 829. 
166 Id. 
167 Armstrong, 649 N.E.2d at 829. 
168 288 N.Y.S.2d 556 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1968). 
169 Id. at 562. 
170 Id. at 560. 
171 See id. at 562. 
172 Id. 
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nuendo” would have supported the plaintiff’s contention.173 
The first New York court to apply the heightened “in-
tent/endorsement” standard was the New York County Supreme 
Court in Rappaport v. VV Publishing Corp.174  The plaintiff, a judge, 
sued the author and publisher of an article that stated that the plaintiff 
was assigned a “disproportionate number of police felony cases” and 
questioned the “fishy” numbers since he had previously represented 
police officers as a criminal defense lawyer.175  The plaintiff claimed 
that the article defamed him with “false implications,” “misimpres-
sions,” and “misleading omissions,” all of which suggested that he 
was engaged in judicial misconduct.176  The court here cited to the 
Fourth Circuit’s Chapin standard for implied defamation before ana-
lyzing the plaintiff’s claims.177  Specifically, the court noted the Cha-
pin standard for defamation by implication: a plaintiff must make an 
“especially rigorous showing” where stated facts are literally true 
since the Constitution protects truthful statements.178  The plaintiff 
must be able to show that the defendant “intends or endorses the in-
ference.”179  Relying on these principles, the court concluded that the 
defendant’s statements lacked evidence of intent or endorsement of a 
defamatory meaning.180 
Interestingly, a more recent Third Department decision did 
not cite the Chapin standard or any similar standard in its analysis of 
the plaintiff’s implied defamation claim.  In Proskin v. Hearst 
Corp.,181 the defendants published an article that discussed how the 
plaintiff, an attorney, had made changes to a client’s will.  According 
to the plaintiff, the article was impliedly defamatory for suggesting 
that the plaintiff had committed a felony by “alter[ing the] client’s 
will to leave $49,000 of the elderly woman’s money to [the plain-
tiff’s] own children,” when the plaintiff had in fact made these 
changes at the client’s request.182  The court’s discussion acknowl-
 
173 Cole Fischer, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 563. 
174 618 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994), aff’d, Rappaport v. VV Publ’g Corp., 
637 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996). 
175 Id. at 747. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 748 (citing Chapin, 933 F.2d at 1092-93). 
178 Id. (quoting Chapin, 933 F.2d at 1092-93). 
179 Rappaport, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (quoting Chapin, 933 F.2d at 1092-93). 
180 Id. at 748-49. 
181 787 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2005). 
182 Id. 
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edged that the doctrine of substantial truth can protect a defendant’s 
statements.183  Since the defendant’s statements in Proskin were not 
facially false, and “innuendo or adverse inferences are not enough to 
establish that the statement was false,” substantial truth was a com-
plete defense here.184  This observation is not inconsistent with other 
New York courts’ implied defamation standards, but unlike Rap-
paport and Stepanov, it does not allow the plaintiff to demonstrate 
falsity by additionally showing the defendant’s intent. 
In Levy v. Johnson,185 one of the most recent New York deci-
sions aside from Stepanov, the Nassau County Supreme Court cited 
language from both Chapin and Rappaport in deciding whether a de-
fendant’s statements were impliedly defamatory.  In Levy, the de-
fendants aired a news story that, according to the plaintiff (a land-
lord), “deliberately omitted” important details and made the plaintiff 
out to be a landlord who discriminated against prospective tenants in-
fected with HIV/AIDS.186  The court commented that implications 
and impressions may lead to defamation, but only with the additional 
proof that the defendant “intended or endorsed the inference.”187  
Since that was not the case in Levy, there was no implied defama-
tion.188 
VII. STEPANOV REVISITED 
The First Department in Stepanov accurately addressed the 
complex issues it faced when a private individual sued for implied 
defamation regarding a matter of public concern.  While its discus-
sion lacked detail that would have proved helpful to its analysis—
such as a broader and more elaborate survey of this nebulous area of 
law—its ultimate conclusions were nevertheless justified. 
The First Department recognized that it needed to weigh the 
interest of the plaintiffs’ defamation claim against the defendant’s 
First Amendment interest in publishing “substantially truthful” 
statements.189  In so doing, the court cited decisions by the Fourth and 
 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 508. 
185 No. 2851/09, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1198 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Feb. 22, 2012). 
186 Id. at *5-6. 
187 Id. at *14 (citing Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092-93). 
188 Id. 
189 Stepanov, 987 N.Y.S.2d at 43. 
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D.C. Circuits, both of which have adopted a standard for implied def-
amation that requires a showing that the defendant “intended or en-
dorsed” the defamatory inference.190  This appears to be the approach 
taken by the majority of the federal circuit courts that have encoun-
tered claims of defamation by implication.  These circuits recognize 
that defamation claims based on unstated implications raise serious 
First Amendment concerns, and the standard of fault must therefore 
be heightened accordingly.  The Stepanov court took these issues into 
consideration and followed federal precedent appropriately.  The Ste-
panov court likewise followed recent New York precedent, which has 
also embraced the intent/endorsement standard, as seen in Rappaport 
and Levy. 
Moreover, the Stepanov court properly addressed the implied 
defamation standard as distinct and independent of the public figure 
actual malice standard.  Several circuit courts have “conflated” these 
two issues, as the plaintiffs in Stepanov attempted to do when they 
challenged the stringent implied defamation standard on the basis that 
they were “not public figures.”191  The Stepanov court remarked that 
while the public figure actual malice standard is a subjective inquiry 
that contemplates the publisher’s state of mind when it created the 
statements, the implied defamation intent/endorsement standard tests 
whether the statement is objectively capable of a defamatory implica-
tion, and it is not a test of fault.192  Courts that conflate these issues 
make it difficult to distinguish the appropriate standard when the 
plaintiff is not a public figure because they only address implied def-
amation in the context of actual malice, which is already a heightened 
standard.  The court in Stepanov separated the two concepts and ad-
dressed them individually, which made the distinction perfectly clear. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The law governing defamation by implication is one that 
lacks consistency among American courts, state and federal alike, 
particularly in light of the unclear laws regarding defamation general-
ly and its constitutional limitations.  Nevertheless, there is a majority 
consensus that the First Amendment free speech and press clauses 
limit defamation claims when an allegedly defamatory statement has 
 
190 Id. (quoting Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1093; White, 909 F.2d at 520). 
191 Id. at 44. 
192 Id. 
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more than one possible meaning.  Most of the federal circuit courts of 
appeals agree that a heightened standard is required to prove a de-
famatory implication, regardless of whether it is in the public or pri-
vate context.  In recent years, the State of New York has joined these 
circuits in applying similar restrictions: when a statement only im-
plicitly defames a plaintiff, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate 
that the defendant intended the defamatory implication.  This stand-
ard properly balances the two important competing interests of a 
plaintiff’s reputation and a defendant’s right to free speech. 
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